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Abstract:  We   examine   the   effects   that   revenue   windfalls   from 
international commodity price booms have on external debt in a panel of 
93 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that 
increases in the international prices of exported commodity goods lead to 
a significant reduction in the level of external debt in democracies, but to 
no significant reduction in the level of external debt in autocracies. To 
explain this result, we show that in autocracies commodity windfalls lead 
to   a   statistically   significant   and   quantitatively   large   increase   in 
government expenditures. In democracies on the other hand government 
expenditures   did   not   increase   significantly.   We   also   document   that 
following commodity windfalls the risk of default on external debt 
decreased in democracies, but increased significantly in autocracies.
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11. Introduction
Developing and emerging market economies are often faced with large international commodity 
price shocks that pose a number of serious challenges to their macroeconomic stability.
1  We 
examine in this paper empirically how these countries use external borrowing to shield themselves 
against these shocks. Recently, the concern that Dubai may default on the large external debt -- that 
it had accumulated over the past years when oil prices were booming -- has rekindled interest 
among policy makers and private investors in how international commodity price fluctuations are 
linked to external debt. We rigorously examine in this paper the link between revenue windfalls 
from international commodity price booms and external debt using panel data for a world sample of 
over 93 countries during the period 1970-2007. We apply panel data techniques that account for 
both unobservable cross-country heterogeneity and common year shocks and identify in our 
empirical analysis the effects that revenue windfalls have on external debt exclusively from the 
within-country variation of the data. 
Our main finding is that increases in the international commodity prices for exported 
commodity goods are associated with a significant reduction in external debt in democracies. In 
autocracies on the other hand, windfalls from international commodity prices did not lead to a 
significant reduction in external debt. While in democracies external debt therefore moved 
countercyclically with revenue windfalls from international commodity prices, there was no 
systematic relationship in autocracies. 
To   explain   the   dichotomous   response   of   external   debt   to   revenue   windfalls   from 
international commodity price booms we examine the response of government spending. It is well 
known that higher international commodity prices are associated in developing and emerging 
market countries with higher revenues that accrue to the government sector. What is not so well 
1 For example, international commodity price shocks may lead to a misalignment of the real exchange rate and a 
depletion of foreign reserves. For empirical analyses of the macroeconomic effects that international commodity 
price shocks have on economic growth see, for example, Deaton and Miller (1995), Collier and Goderis (2007), or 
Bruckner and Ciccone (2010). 
2known however is whether governments in these countries systematically use the additional 
revenues to increase primarily total government expenditures, or reduce the level of debt. We find 
that in autocracies, windfalls from international commodity prices lead to a statistically significant 
and quantitatively large increase in government spending. In democracies on the other hand, the 
response in government spending to windfalls from international commodity prices is quantitatively 
small and statistically not significant. Hence, an examination of movements in government 
expenditures shows a significant procyclicality of government spending in autocracies, while in 
democracies government spending was acyclical. 
The strong procyclicality of government expenditures to commodity price windfalls in 
autocracies may explain why external debt was not significantly reduced in these countries: 
additional revenues accruing from international commodity price windfalls were directly spent by 
autocratic governments, with little to no savings left from which to finance a reduction in external 
debt.   To   examine   this   spending   channel   further,   we   document   that   while   in   democracies 
international commodity price windfalls were associated with a significant increase in real per 
capita GDP, in autocracies GDP per capita did not increase significantly despite the significant 
increase in total government expenditures.
Our paper is most closely related to the political economy literature on debt policy. Two key 
predictions from this literature are that more political uncertainty leads to a higher level of external 
debt, and that excessive corruption introduces procyclicality in government spending to revenue 
windfalls (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Alesina et al., 2008). To the extent that the severity of 
political uncertainty and corruption is higher in autocracies, the empirical results of our paper 
resonate these key predictions from the theoretical political economy literature on debt policy. 
Our paper also contributes to a richer understanding of the link between political institutions 
and policy outcomes (see for example Persson, 2002). In their seminal contribution to the growth 
and institutions literature, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) have shown that political institutions are 
3key determinants for long-run economic development. Our present empirical analysis sheds novel 
insights on a specific, but nevertheless potentially important channel through which political 
institutions place developing and emerging market economies on different development paths: the 
accumulation of external debt that is due to plausibly exogenous changes in the international 
commodity export prices. Indeed, the debt overhang literature has argued for a long time that high 
external debt levels have adverse effects on real per capita GDP growth (see for example Krugman, 
1989; or Sachs, 1990). The main concern is that high external debt levels effectively act as a tax on 
future investment projects, and thus constrain the financing of these projects in the future. Our 
empirical results show that democracies use the additional revenues from international commodity 
price windfalls to reduce their external debt levels, but that autocracies systematically fail to do so. 
Instead,   the   later   directly   spend   a   large   part   of   their   additional   revenues   on   government 
expenditures.   Our   empirical   results   therefore   suggest   that   democracies   use   windfalls   from 
international commodity price booms more conservatively than autocracies, and thus effectively 
evade the future tax burden on investment that stems from an accumulation of external debt. 
The empirical results in our paper also contribute novel empirical insights on the voracity 
effect described in the theoretical models of Lane and Tornell (1998) and Tornell and Lane (1999) 
where   revenue   windfalls   from   positive   terms-of-trade   shocks   are   predicted   to   lead   to   a 
disproportionate increase in fiscal redistribution in countries with weak legal-political institutions. 
As stressed by the authors, from a theoretical point of view it is unclear whether a shift from 
autocracy to democracy ameliorates or exacerbates this voracity effect. What matters for the 
voracity effect is whether strong democratic institutions successfully constrain powerful groups 
from extracting transfers from the government budget. 
Our empirical results suggest that this is indeed the case: democracies are on average more 
successful in constraining powerful groups from extracting transfers from the government budget in 
the wake of windfalls from international commodity price booms than autocracies. In particular, 
4when we focus specifically on the constraints placed on the political executive by the political 
institutions in place we find a significant positive effect of international commodity price booms on 
government expenditures in countries with weak executive constraints, and an insignificant effect of 
international commodity price booms  on government expenditures  in countries with strong 
executive   constraints.   Moreover,   for   countries   with   strong   executive   constraints   positive 
international commodity price booms had also a significant positive effect on real per capita GDP 
growth, while in countries with weak executive constraints revenue windfalls from international 
commodity price booms did not affect GDP per capita growth significantly. Hence, our empirical 
analysis provides evidence that the voracity effect was well at work in countries with weak political 
institutions, but that countries with strong political institutions were mostly shielded from it.
2 
Finally, and perhaps most interesting for policy makers and private investors we show that while 
windfalls from international commodity price booms reduced the risk of default on external debt in 
democracies, this risk significantly increased in autocracies. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as followed. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data 
Commodity Revenue Windfalls. We construct a country-specific international commodity export 
price index that captures revenue windfalls from international commodity prices as: 
where ComPricec,t is the international price of commodity c in year t, and θi,c is the average (time-
invariant) value of exports of commodity c in the GDP of country i. We obtain data on annual 
international commodity prices for the 1970-2007 period from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics. 
Our data on the value of commodity exports is from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. 
2 This result is also consistent with the cross-sectional finding by Mehlum et al. (2006) that natural resource 
dependence is a curse for economic growth in countries with weak political institutions, but that in countries with 
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qThe commodities included in our index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, 
iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case there were multiple 
prices listed for the same commodity we used a simple average of all the relevant prices.
External Debt. Data on the total external debt stock are from the World Bank, Global Development 
Finance (2009). Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, 
goods, or services.
3  We focus on external debt because data on domestic public debt are not 
available for many countries, and are moreover difficult to compare across countries as countries 
with weak administrative capacity often consolidate their accounts at the central government level 
whereas countries with strong administrative capacity often consolidate their accounts at the general 
government level. 
Democracy. Democracy is measured by the revised combined Polity score (Polity2) of the Polity 
IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The Polity2 score ranges from -10 to +10. Following 
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2006) and the Polity IV project, we code countries as democracies 
(autocracies) if their Polity2 score is strictly positive (negative). To examine also specifically the 
political competition and executive constraints channel, we  use the polity sub-scores on constraints 
on the chief executive and political competition. According to the Polity IV project, constraints on 
the executive is a measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making 
powers of chief executives and ranges from 1 to 7, with greater values indicating tighter constraints. 
Political competition measures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership 
can be pursued in the political arena. This indicator ranges from 1 to 10, with greater values 
denoting more competition. Summary statistics on these variables can be found in Appendix Tables 
1 and 2.
3 Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and 
interest in arrears on long-term debt. About two-thirds of total external debt is public and publicly guaranteed debt.
63. Estimation Strategy
To examine the effects that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on 
external debt and other key variables of interest, we estimate the following econometric model:
where αi are country fixed effects that capture time-invariant country-specific unobservables and βt 
are year fixed effects that capture common year shocks. ui,t is an error term that is clustered at the 
country level. As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal effect that commodity 
export price fluctuations have on external debt in a world sample. We then split the sample into 
autocracies and democracies and estimate separately for these two groups the effects that export 
price fluctuations have on external debt (and other key variables of interest). To formally test 
whether the estimated coefficient on the international commodity export price index in the 
autocracy sample is significantly different from the estimated coefficient in the democracy sample 
we apply a generalized form of the Chow test that allows for arbitrary within-country serial 
correlation of the error term. 
4. Main Results
Table 1 presents our estimates of the average marginal effect that revenue windfalls from 
international commodity price fluctuations have on external debt in a world sample. The main 
finding from the distributed lag estimates is that positive t-1 change in the international commodity 
export price index leads to a significant reduction in external debt. Column (1) presents the pooled 
panel estimates that do not control for country or year fixed effects and this yields a significant 
negative t-1 effect of international commodity export price index on external debt that is significant 
at the 1% level. In column (2) the country fixed effects are included in the regression which does 
not change the point estimates substantially. When controlling in addition to the country fixed 
effects for also the year fixed effects that capture global business cycle effects the effect of t-1 
commodity revenue windfalls on external debt becomes smaller in absolute size but remains 
7
t i t i t i t i u ComPI bt ExternalDe , , , ) log( ) log( + D + + = D g b anegative and statistically significant at the 5% level (column (3)). Quantitatively, the year and 
country fixed effects estimates imply that a positive commodity price windfall of size 1 standard 
deviation significantly decreased on average external debt by over 0.03 standard deviations.
4 
In column (4) we present panel fixed effects estimates that include on the right-hand side of 
the estimating equation the commodity price index in period t+1. The motivation for including the 
period t+1 commodity price index is to check whether external debt reacts to future, potentially 
anticipated changes in international commodity prices. We find that the point estimate on the period 
t+1 commodity price index is not statistically significant. Quantitatively, the point estimate is also 
quite small. Hence, we do not find evidence of significant anticipatory effects.
5 Moreover, the effect 
of period t-1 commodity price shocks on external debt remains negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. 
To take into account dynamics in the evolution of external debt, we show in columns (5) and 
(6) dynamic panel estimates that include on the right-hand side of the estimating equation the 
lagged level of external debt. Both the least squares and system-GMM estimates show that there is 
quite a bit of persistence in the dynamics of the external debt stock. The estimated convergence 
coefficient is around -0.12 to -0.16 and implies a half-life in shocks to the level of external debt of 
around 4 years. Most importantly, the dynamic panel data estimates confirm that there is a 
significant negative t-1 effect of international commodity price booms on external debt.
6 
In Table 2 we examine how democratic institutions  affect the relationship  between 
international   commodity   price   booms   and   debt   accumulation   by   separating   countries   into 
democracies and autocracies (based on the Polity IV data). Our main finding is that the significant 
4 We have checked whether there is an asymmetry between positive and negative changes in the international 
commodity export price index by including in the regression an interaction dummy that captures differences in the 
marginal effect between negative and positive changes. We found that this interaction variable on differences in the 
marginal effect between negative and positive changes in the international commodity price index is statistically 
insignificant. We also checked for further non-linearities by including a quadratic term of international commodity 
price index, which also turned out to be insignificant.  
5 We have also checked for the statistical significance of further leads in commodity price shocks and found that they 
were insignificant. 
6 We have also checked whether price shocks of different commodities (i.e. minerals vs. agricultural commodities) 
have different effects on external debt. We did not find a significantly different impact of these two categories 
(results not shown).
8negative effect of international commodity price booms on external debt is particularly large and 
statistically significant for democracies. For autocracies we find that the estimated relationship is 
statistically insignificant and quantitatively the point estimates are very small. The point estimate in 
column   (1)   implies   that   for   countries   with   democratic   institutions   a   positive   international 
commodity price shock of size 1 standard deviation leads to a significant reduction in external debt 
by over 0.05 standard deviations. The Chow test rejects the hypothesis that the structural coefficient 
in the autocracy sample is the same as the structural coefficient in the democracy sample. Hence, 
the Chow test confirms that also in the statistical sense the effect of international commodity booms 
on external debt in democracies is significantly different from the effect in autocracies. 
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 2 show that we obtain similar results when running separate 
regressions for countries with strong executive constraints and strong political competition on the 
one hand, and countries with weak executive constraints and weak political competition on the 
other hand. In particular, in countries with strong executive constraints and a high degree of 
political competition we find that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a 
statistically significant and a quantitatively large reduction in external debt (see columns (3) and 
(5)). In countries with weak executive constraints and weak political competition windfalls from 
international commodity price booms do not lead on average to a significant reduction in external 
debt (see columns (2) and (4)). Moreover, Table 3 shows that importantly these results continue to 
hold when controlling for the lagged level of external debt and Appendix Table 1 shows that results 
are also robust to running an interaction model that allows for possible heterogeneity in the 
structural relationship due to cross-country differences in (average) GDP per capita.
A possible explanation for why windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to 
a significant reduction in external debt in countries with strong democratic institutions, but not in 
countries with weak democratic institutions is that strong democratic institutions effectively 
constrain political leaders in spending additional revenues on wasteful activities. In Table 4, we 
9provide supportive empirical evidence for this explanation by documenting that in autocracies and 
countries that have weak executive constraints and slack political competition, revenue windfalls 
from international commodity price booms lead to a highly significant and quantitatively large 
increase in total government expenditures.
7 On the other hand, in democracies and countries with 
strong executive constraints and strong political competition commodity price booms did not lead to 
a significant increase in total government expenditures. Table 4 therefore shows that while in 
autocracies commodity windfalls were used to increase government spending, this did not happen 
systematically so in democracies. 
In Table 5 we explore a further channel through which dichotomy in the response of external 
debt to international commodity price booms may arise: the rule of law, which is a safeguard 
against arbitrary governance and abuse by those who are in power. Interestingly, we find that in 
democracies the rule of law significantly increased in the presence of windfalls from international 
commodity price booms. On the other hand, in autocracies the rule of law deteriorated, or at best 
did not change significantly. Note that in autocracies the relationship is quite imprecisely estimated 
so that we cannot reject that the effect is significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, we can 
reject that the structural relationship between windfalls from international commodity price booms 
and the rule of law in democracies is the same as in democracies. 
Table 6 documents that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms were 
associated with higher real per capita GDP growth in democracies and countries with strong 
executive constraints and high levels of political competition. In autocracies and countries with 
weak executive constraints and low levels of political competition -- where a large part of the 
commodity price windfalls were directly spent by the government (see Table 4) -- there was no 
significant effect on real per capita GDP growth however. This suggests that while commodity price 
windfalls were conservatively administered in democracies, in autocracies the high government 
spending did not  lead to a significant increase in output. All in all, our results therefore point to 
7 Data on total government expenditures are from Heston et al. (2009).
10revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms leading to a significant reduction in 
external debt in democracies because the democratic institutions placed sufficient constraints on 
politicians, prohibiting them from spending the windfalls on socially sub-optimal activities.
8 
Importantly, Table 7 shows that there is a significant positive response in the terms of trade for both 
democracies and autocracies, with the (elasticity) effect being actually larger for autocracies than 
for democracies. Hence, it is not the case that international commodity export price changes had 
smaller effects on the terms of trade in autocracies than in democracies.
In Table 8 we report the effect that international commodity price booms have on the risk of 
the country defaulting on its external debt.
9 We use the conditional logit fixed effects estimator to 
take into account the nonlinear structure of our dependent variable and that standard nonlinear 
probability models (such as the logit or probit model) produce biased estimates of the slope 
coefficients when country fixed effects are used.
10  Consistent with our previous findings, the 
nonlinear   probability   estimates   show   that   the   structural   relationship   between   international 
commodity price booms and the risk of default in democracies is significantly different from the 
structural relationship in autocracies. Moreover, in autocracies we find that the risk of default 
significantly increases following revenue windfalls from international commodity price increases.
11 
This finding matches indeed well with the recent concern of a possible default of Dubai on its 
external debt. For the democracy sample, we also find that the estimated effect that international 
commodity price booms have on the risk of debt default is negative. Statistically, we are unable to 
reject that in the democracy sample the effect of revenue windfalls from commodity price booms  is 
different from zero. However, this is due to a much larger standard error on the point estimates in 
8 Obviously, we recognize that government expenditures could have potentially high social returns in autocracies. 
However, they may be rendered inefficient because of the lack of transparency and corruption that is associated with 
government spending in many autocratic regimes. 
9 The data on external debt default are from Beers and Chambers (2003).
10 This is due to the incidental parameter problem (see for example Wooldridge, 2002). The conditional logit fixed 
effects model does not suffer from this bias because slope estimates are computed from using maximum likelihood 
estimation of the density function that is conditional on the country fixed effects. Note that the point estimates 
reported in Table 8 do not represent marginal effects because this would require knowledge of the distribution of the 
country fixed effects.
11 This finding matches with the graphical and mostly informal evidence presented in Manzano and Rigobon (2001) 
that rising commodity prices in the 70s triggered a debt overhang in many resource rich countries. 
11the democracy sample, which follows from the democracy sample being quite a bit smaller than the 
autocracy sample. Moreover, quantitatively the size of the point estimates is actually larger (in 
absolute terms) in the democracy sample than in the autocracy sample. 
5. Conclusion
We have examined in this paper the relationship between revenue windfalls from international 
commodity price booms and external debt using rigorous panel data techniques that allow to 
identify the effects that international commodity price booms have on external debt exclusively 
from the within-country variation of the data. Our main finding is that external debt moves 
countercyclically with commodity revenue windfalls, but that this relationship is not unconditional 
on the political institutions that are in place in the debtor country. In particular, we find that while 
external debt moved highly countercyclically in democracies it moved acyclically in autocracies. 
We made an attempt to explain this finding by documenting that autocracies mostly spent the 
additional revenues accruing from international commodity price booms by increasing government 
expenditures, while democracies kept a large part of the windfalls to reduce their external debt. Our 
empirical results therefore highlight the role of political institutions in shaping external debt policy. 
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14Table 1. Commodity Windfalls and External Debt
Δ External Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











































Country Fe No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2676 2676 2676 2583 2676 2676
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of external debt. The method of estimation in columns (1)-(5) is least squares; column (6) system-
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-values shown in parentheses below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
15Table 2. Commodity Windfalls, Democracy, and External Debt
Δ External Debt





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
[0.08] . [0.04] . [0.08]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1221 1445 1283 1383 1162 1504
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of external debt. The method of estimation is least squares. P-values are reported [in square brackets] 
on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively, columns (3) and (5)) on ΔComPI  is the same as in column 
(2) (respectively, columns (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a strictly positive 
(negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) 
median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, 
*** 99 percent confidence.
Table 3. Commodity Windfalls, Democracy, and External Debt
Δ External Debt

































Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
. [0.06] . [0.05] . [0.02]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1221 1445 1283 1383 1162 1504
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of external debt. The method of estimation is system-GMM. P-values are reported [in square brackets] 
on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively, columns (3) and (5)) on ΔComPI  is the same as in column 
(2) (respectively, columns (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a strictly positive 
(negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) 
median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, 
*** 99 percent confidence.
16Table 4. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and Government Expenditures
Δ Government Expenditures





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
. [0.004] . [0.008] . [0.004]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2314 2269 2459 2124 2415 2168
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of total government expenditures. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in 
parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. P-values are reported [in 
square brackets] on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively column (3) and (5)), on ΔComPI is the 
same as in column (2) (respectively, column (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a 
strictly positive (negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity 
IV database an above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
    
Table 5. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Rule of Law
Δ Rule of Law





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1256 1214 1334 1136 1214 1256
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the ICRG rule of law variable. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in 
parentheses) below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. P-values are reported [in 
square brackets] on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively, column (3)) and (5)), on ΔComPI is the 
same as in column (2) (respectively, column (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a 
strictly positive (negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity 
IV database an above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
17Table 6. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth
Δ GDP





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
. [0.05] . [0.04] . [0.03]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2314 2269 2459 2124 2267 2316
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of real per capita GDP. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) 
below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. P-values are reported [in square brackets] 
on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively, column (3) and (5)), on ΔComPI is the same as in column 
(2) (respectively, column (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a strictly positive 
(negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) 
median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, 
*** 99 percent confidence.
Table 7. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Terms of Trade
ΔTOT





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
. [0.00] . [0.00] . [0.00]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2314 2269 2459 2124 2267 2316
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of the terms of trade. The method of estimation is least squares; t-values (shown in parentheses) below 
the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. P-values are reported [in square brackets] on the 
null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point estimate in column (1) (respectively, column (3) and (5)), on ΔComPI is the same as in column (2) 
(respectively, column (4) and (6)). Democracy (Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a strictly positive 
(negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) 
median sample score of executive constraints; strong (weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an 
above (below) median sample score of political competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, 
*** 99 percent confidence.
18Table 8. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Risk of Default on External Debt
Default on External Debt





















Chow Test: Coefficient is 
same as in Col. (1); resp. 
Col. (3); resp. Col. (5)
. [0.06] . [0.01] . [0.02]
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 1174 708 1106 638 1176
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that is 1 if the country defaulted on external debt. The method of estimation for the conditional 
logit fixed effects model is maximum likelihood. P-values are reported [in square brackets] on the null hypothesis of the Chow test that the point 
estimate in column (1) (respectively, column (3) and (5)) on ΔComPI is the same as in column (2) (respectively, column (4) and (6)). Democracy 
(Autocracy) refers to countries that according to the Polity IV database have a strictly positive (negative) Polity2 score. Strong (weak) executive 
constraints refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) median sample score of executive constraints; strong 
(weak) political competition refers to countries that have according to the Polity IV database an above (below) median sample score of political 
competition. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
19Appendix Table 1. Commodity Windfalls, Democracy, and External Debt 



































Country Fe Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2548 2548 2548
Note: The dependent variable is the log-change of external debt. The method of estimation is system-GMM; t-values (shown in parentheses) below 
the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
20Data Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
ΔExternal Debt 0.095 0.253 -1.427 3.900 2676
ΔComPI 0.001 0.008 -0.059 0.152 2676
ΔGovernment Expenditures 0.012 0.152 -2.135 1.719 2670
ΔGDP 0.032 0.078 -1.107 0.718 2670
ΔRule of Law 0.026 0.473 -2.5 3 1468
ΔTerms of Trade 0.000 0.046 -0.519 0.573 2670
Polity2 Score -0.546 4.740 -10 10 2676
Executive Constraints Score 3.647 1.525 1 7 2676
Political Competition Score 4.687 2.173 1 10 2676
Data Appendix Table 2. List of Countries
Note: The Table lists the external debt to GDP ratio and the commodity export to GDP ratio. Both ratios are multiplied by 100.
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Country ExtDebt/GDP ComExp/GDP Country ExtDebt/GDP ComExp/GDP
Albania 95 0.4 Madagascar 214 1.3
Algeria 144 5.2 Malawi 149 2.8
Angola 347 9.5 Malaysia 115 5.5
Argentina 167 0.7 Mali 216 1.1
Armenia 69 0.1 Mauritania 365 5.9
Bangladesh 50 0 Mauritius 78 2.9
Belarus 22 0.2 Mexico 123 0.9
Belize 159 4.2 Mongolia 151 1.6
Benin 145 1.2 Morocco 133 0.1
Bolivia 178 0.6 Mozambique 258 0.8
Brazil 96 0.7 Nepal 39 0
Bulgaria 189 0.7 Nicaragua 583 2.7
Burkina Faso 77 0.5 Niger 141 0.4
Burundi 140 1.5 Nigeria 137 7.5
Cambodia 88 0.3 Pakistan 67 0.3
Cameroon 154 4 Panama 319 1.1
Chad 54 0.8 Papua New Guinea 224 10.8
Chile 150 2.6 Paraguay 82 1.3
Colombia 83 1.5 Peru 159 1.2
Costa Rica 137 1.6 Philippines 125 0.6
Cote d`Ivoire 296 5.9 Poland 174 0.3
Croatia 341 1.2 Romania 66 0.6
Djibouti 98 0.6 Russia 123 2.4
Dominican Republic 85 1.6 Rwanda 84 0.9
Ecuador 172 2.6 Samoa 182 0.7
El Salvador 99 1.9 Senegal 163 0.3
Ethiopia 111 0.6 Seychelles 244 2.7
Fiji 66 4.3 Sierra Leone 97 0.6
Gabon 274 14.9 Somalia 437 0.3
Gambia, The 207 0.6 South Africa 69 0.7
Georgia 75 0.5 Sri Lanka 80 1.3
Ghana 158 4.5 Sudan 314 1.1
Guatemala 50 1.5 Tajikistan 80 2
Guinea 104 1.6 Tanzania 331 1.7
Guinea-Bissau 764 3.1 Thailand 100 1.1
Guyana 756 13.4 Togo 265 2
Haiti 62 0.6 Tunisia 141 1.1
Honduras 178 1.9 Turkey 165 0.4
India 33 0.2 Turkmenistan 39 0.8
Indonesia 100 2.1 Uganda 112 2.4
Jamaica 207 2.7 Ukraine 61 0.5
Jordan 265 0 Uruguay 154 1.3
Kazakhstan 127 3.1 Uzbekistan 85 3.1
Kenya 99 1.4 Vietnam 96 0.7
Latvia 323 7.2 Zambia 421 7.8
Lebanon 181 0.2 Zimbabwe 98 1.2
Liberia 1605 18.6 Average  187 2.3